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Adjustment Difficulties and Debt 
Overhangs in the Eurozone Periphery 
CEPS Working Document No. 347/ May 2011 
Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi 
Introduction 
During the first decade after the start of EMU, the euro area and more broadly the global 
economy ware characterised by an unprecedented credit boom. The expansion of credit was 
particularly strong in four peripheral countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
(hereafter GIPS). The difficulties these countries are now experiencing derive simply from 
the ‘sudden stop’ of the large private capital inflows they had received until recently. 
Market financing, which had been excessively abundant until 2009 for both governments and 
the private sector, suddenly dried up during 2010: at a certain point the government of 
Greece, and then of Ireland and Portugal were no longer able to fund themselves at any 
price. In order to prevent a disorderly default, ‘Europe’ (or rather the financially stronger EU 
member states) had to provide them with substantial financial support, first on a bilateral 
basis (Greece), and then via a hastily created new institution, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). 
The underlying assumption of the European-led rescue effort has been that the countries in 
question only face a temporary liquidity crisis and that a relatively short and sharp 
adjustment effort should be sufficient for them to resolve their fundamental problems 
(mostly fiscal and external deficits); thus making it possible to again have access to 
international capital markets.   
This paper aims to provide background material on the key parameters and mechanisms that 
will determine the success of the adjustment efforts. 
Before going into detail, it will be useful to emphasize one peculiarity of EMU: within the 
euro area, the usual assumption that public debt is risk-free does not hold. The reason is that 
no individual euro area country has access to the printing press. The latter is what makes 
government debt risk-free in nominal terms in countries with their own currency. In this 
sense, in the peripheral euro area countries, public debt has more of the characteristics of 
private or perhaps ‘sub-sovereign’ debt than of a risk-free security.  
It is only in countries with solid public finances (essentially Germany and some of its 
neighbours) that public debt remains public debt in the sense in which the term is usually 
used. 
What is thus happening in the euro area is the age-old process whereby creditors put 
pressure upon governments to support the weaker debtors (banks and/or euro peripheral 
governments). If history serves as any guide, this pressure will prevail because the 
alternative is perceived to be a potentially disruptive breakdown in markets, which will 
further delay recovery. 
In this sense, Europe seems destined to repeat the classic bust scenario in which private debt 
becomes public debt but with the difference that governments of core European countries 
take on the debt of peripheral countries, both private and public. However, the willingness 2 |  GROS & ALCIDI 
 
and ability of the core countries to accept this burden are limited. Hence one needs to 
prepare for the second stage of crisis, namely an increased risk of sovereign default. This 
danger is likely to persist for some time.  
In this paper we shall focus on the analysis of the position of peripheral eurozone countries, 
the GIPS mentioned above, but we will also scrutinize data for Italy, which is sometimes 
thought to be in a similar situation. We thus look at the ‘GIPSY’ (for Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and ItalY). 
The following analysis shall show that these five economies in reality are quite different. 
Portugal and Greece share two key features, namely high external debt and an extremely low 
rate of national savings. The latter implies that these two countries have to rely continuously 
on large inflows of capital to finance consumption.1  
By contrast, Spain has a much lower debt to start with and higher savings rate, but it is very 
exposed to financial markets because its construction boom went hand in hand with a huge 
expansion of financial activity. Since house prices have not yet fully adjusted, the magnitude 
of the potential losses in the banking sector is still unknown.  
In Ireland house prices have fallen more than in Spain and the losses in the banking sector 
have been so large that the government could not absorb them without outside support. 
These two adversities lie at the heart of Ireland fiscal troubles. In a strict sense, in Greece and 
Portugal the problem of the sovereigns is potentially insolvency, while in Ireland and Spain 
it should be illiquidity. Of course, the difference is never so clear-cut ex ante and insolvency 
of banks could lead to sovereign insolvency  
Italy seems different from both of these subgroups in that its savings rate is as high as in 
Ireland and Spain and its foreign imbalances are much smaller. With a rather conservative 
financial sector, it should be able to weather the storm quite well, but given the high level of 
public debt, avoiding deterioration of its saving position is crucial. 
The remainder of this note analyzes the three main aspects that determine the (fiscal and 
external) adjustment process in Greece and the other peripheral euro area member countries. 
The first objective of this investigation is to examine the fiscal adjustment, its impact on 
demand and, hence, on output and tax revenues, which could potentially create a vicious 
circle. Section 3 sheds light on the role of capital flows in affecting debt sustainability 
analysis. Section 4 investigates the reliance of each of the countries on foreign capital and 
borrowing. Section 5 identifies different aggregates to measure external debt for each of the 
GIPSY countries, evaluates their adjustment needs and compares them with the experience 
of the Baltic states after 2008. It concludes that given the current combinations of high-risk 
premia, low growth and very high external debt levels, doubts about the sustainability of the 
external position of Greece and Portugal are justified. The last section concludes and 
provides some policy recommendations. 
1.  On the fiscal adjustment and its feasibility 
The ‘euro crisis’ started when the true scale of the disarray in Greek public finances was 
revealed in late 2009. After that, Greece was required to put in place tough austerity 
programmes to improve its fiscal position. We thus start with the analysis of the possible 
consequences of large fiscal adjustment programmes. 
                                                      
1 See Gros (2010b).  
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As mentioned earlier, the first benchmark for the cost of the fiscal adjustment in terms of 
output fall can be obtained using the Keynesian multiplier. To keep things simple, we 
consider the simplest macro model: an open economy, where consumption depends on 
income, exports are determined by foreign demand (and hence exogenous in the short run) 
and imports vary proportionally with domestic income (see Annex A for the derivation). 
Table 2 shows the impact of the fiscal adjustment on output in the five peripheral eurozone 
countries required to meet the Maastricht criterion of 3% deficit relative to GDP.  
Table 2. Simple Keynesian multipliers 
Country Keynesian  multiplier: 
1/(1-c+m)=1/(s+m) 
Excess deficit  
(actual 2009 – 3%) 
Impact of fiscal adjustment 
on output relative to 
baseline, in % 
Greece  2.5  12.4  -31.0 
Ireland  1.3  11.4  -14.8 
Portugal  1.7  6.4  -10.7 
Spain  2.0  8.1  -16.2 
Italy  1.5  2.2  -3.3 
Note: The marginal savings rate, s, is computed as the ratio of the increment in private savings relative to the 
increment in GDP over the period 2002-07; similarly the marginal propensity to import, m, is computed as the 
ratio of the increment in imports relative to the increment in GDP over the same period. 
Sources: European Commission Services (AMECO database) and authors’ calculations. 
The data suggest that, with the exception of Italy, the adjustment would be so large as to be 
politically unfeasible. This judgment would not change even if one takes into account that 
the adjustment would be stretched over a number of years and if the numbers in the last 
column would be corrected for the cumulative effect of the trend growth over this period. 
For Greece, even assuming a trend growth rate of 3% per annum, and 3-year adjustment 
period, the overall predicted fall in GDP would still be more than 20%. 
In the standard approach of assessing the effect of fiscal stimuli, large multipliers are seen as 
‘magnifiers’ of fiscal policy measures and are therefore welcome. However, large multipliers 
also imply that the contractionary effect of fiscal consolidation is going to be larger. Greece 
exhibits the largest multiplier as it is the country with the lowest (gross) savings rate (12% on 
average, compared to 24% in Germany for instance), while Ireland is the country with the 
smallest. Given the combination of the largest multiplier and largest adjustment need, 
Greece stands out as the country with the largest impact of the fiscal adjustment on GDP. In 
2009 Ireland had a similar fiscal adjustment need2, but the estimated impact on output was 
smaller given that it is a much more open economy.  
The reference to 2009 might overestimate the adjustment in Greece, as 2009 represents an 
outlier with respect to both the preceding and the following year. The correction of about 5-6 
percentage points achieved in 2010 coincided with a drop in GDP of 4.5%, (about 6% lower 
than baseline GDP growth, assumed to be +1.5%), which would suggest a somewhat lower 
multiplier, but the outlook for 2011 foresees a further fall and a fiscal balance that remains 
still largely negative. What past experiences so far suggest is that, under these conditions, 
further fiscal correction will become more and more politically difficult. 
                                                      
2 The adjustment need, and its attendant impact on the GDP, has increased dramatically and sharply 
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Overall, while the simplistic multipliers used here may exaggerate the severity of the 
recession that would follow the fiscal adjustment required by a strict adherence to the 
Maastricht criteria, they clearly illustrate that the assumption that GDP growth can remain 
positive over large fiscal adjustment periods is unrealistic and that the large negative impact 
on output driven by the fiscal adjustment might well be politically impossible in some of the 
countries.3 These might be the reasons why financial markets continue to harbour doubts 
about the sustainability of public finances of these countries.4 
2.  Have markets been irrational? How capital flows create their own 
fundamentals 
It is often remarked that until recently financial markets have seemed to provide Greece with 
ample financing, although its current account deficits and the (approximate) size of its public 
debt were well known. However, this was during a period when Greek GDP, as well as the 
Irish and the Spanish GDP, were growing in nominal terms by over 7% and nominal (long-
term) interest rates were around 4%. With the nominal growth rate 3 percentage points 
higher than the interest rate, public debt sustainability was not an issue. However, the 
situation changed radically in 2009. As shown in Table 3 with the crisis breaking in, nominal 
(actual and expected) growth rates have become much smaller or even negative and market 
interest rates asked on governments debt, as well as the private sector, have started to rise.  
Table 3. The evolution of key factors for sustainability: Growth rates of nominal GDP and nominal 
interest rates 
 
GDP  
(nominal growth rate)  Difference  
Long-term nominal 
interest rate  Difference  
 2003-07  2009-12 
Change: 
Boom to bust  2003-07 
After 
2010* 
Change: 
Boom to bust 
Greece  7.3  -0.6 -7.9  4.1  11  6.9 
Ireland  7.5  -2.5 -10  3.9  9  5.1 
Portugal  3.7  0.4 -3.3  4.0  7  3 
Spain  7.4  0.4 -7.0  3.9  4.8  0.9 
Italy  3.5  1.2 -2.4  4.1  4.5  0.4 
*  Long-term interest rates are very difficult to forecast and, given the high level of uncertainty, subject to 
significant changes even in the short run. Moreover, since 2010, Greece and Ireland are under special refinancing 
programmes so that market rates matter only relatively. The data in the table are supposed to reflect market 
conditions and are derived assuming a risk-free rate at 3% (roughly the return on 10-year German bund) and risk 
premia of 8, 6, 4, 1.8 and 1.5% in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, respectively. The risk premia are the 
actual ones of early 2011. 
Sources: European Commission Services (AMECO) and authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                      
3 See Alcidi & Gros (2010) on the European experience with large fiscal adjustments. 
4 As will be shown later, Greece suffers from twin deficits: a large fiscal deficit and an equally large 
current account deficit. Sustainability requires dealing with both, but this would require a change in 
the behaviour of the private sector, which cannot be controlled by the government. Therefore under 
the assumption that import behaviour stays unchanged and no improvement in competition 
materialises, the fall in GDP induced by fiscal austerity will reduce imports, but it may be not 
sufficient to eliminate the present deficit. 6 |  GROS & ALCIDI 
 
Here again Greece seems in an extreme situation compared to the other countries. The fall in 
the growth rate of nominal GDP is the largest, close to 8 percentage points, and the increase 
in the interest rate is also the largest.   
One way of defining sustainability of public finances is to ensure that the primary balance 
deficit is large enough to offset the so-called ‘snowball effect’.5 If this condition is satisfied, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio does not increase. During the boom phase, i.e. until 2007, when the 
growth rate of nominal GDP was much larger than the cost of refinancing its debt, 
governments could thus run a primary deficit and still keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.6  
However, the crisis brought much lower growth prospects and a much higher risk premium. 
If Greece were to pay an interest rate of 11%, as market rates suggest in early 2011, and given 
that its growth rate for 2011 is expected to be negative (-2.4 according to the IMF review in 
March 2011)7 and its debt–to-GDP ratio at around 1.4, the primary balance surplus required 
to prevent the debt ratio from increasing would be about 20% of GDP. Of course, such a high 
interest rate and low growth are not representative of the long run and debt sustainability is 
a long-run issue. However they show a tendency and influence financial markets in the short 
run.  
The figures in Table 4 show the adjustment needed to ensure that the debt ratio does not 
increase and is rather close to the adjustment that is needed to satisfy the Stability Pact.8 
Table 4. The actual fiscal adjustment required to prevent debt-to-GDP ratio from increasing 
  
Actual (2010) 
primary balance 
 % of GDP 
Primary surplus (% of GDP) 
required for sustainability 
Adjustment required for 
sustainability 
Greece  -3.2 18  21.2 
Greece*  -3.2 4.2  7.4 
Ireland**  -10.0 4.9  14.9 
Ireland***  -10 2.9  12.9 
Portugal  -4.4 2.5  7.5 
Spain  -7.3 1.3  10.7 
Italy  -0.4 3.1  3.6 
Note:  Primary surplus required for sustainability is derived from the equation (B1) in Appendix B. In the 
calculations we have assumed that the long-term interest rates are the ones shown in Table 3 (column “After 
2010”), while for the growth rate we have assumed 1.5% for each of the countries. For Greece and Ireland we 
presented both the requirements under market conditions as of early 2011 and the conditions created by their 
rescue packages. 
* This adjustments are based on the IMF review, which assumes that the future average interest rate is about 6% 
and the nominal growth rate 3%. 
** The actual primary deficit of Ireland in 2010 is much larger, it amounts to 29.3 percentage points of GDP as 
consequence of the funding of the Anglo Irish Bank, the value shown in the table is an average of the 2009 and 
(expected) 2011 deficits. 
*** The adjustment is based on interest rates of 6%, as applied by the EFSF. 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data and IMF.  
                                                      
5 This is obtained by multiplying the level of debt by the difference between the interest rate and the 
growth rate.  
6 The exact level of this ratio is difficult to pin down for Greece given the repeated massaging of the 
figures; in any case it was far larger than 3% and does not matter in this context. 
7 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1168.pdf. 
8 See Economic Forecast Autumn 2009 for a description of the unsustainable path of Government 
debt, in the euro area members, under the hypothesis of no fiscal adjustment. ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES AND DEBT OVERHANG IN THE EUROZONE PERIPHERY | 7 
 
One question is how growth perspectives could change so drastically to reverse the debt 
sustainability over a very short time span. The answer to this question lies in the drivers of 
growth during the boom period. After the creation of the euro, large capital flows started to 
fly from core eurozone countries into the periphery. The peripheral eurozone economies 
(mainly Greece, Ireland and Spain) in their catching-up phase appeared to core European 
member states with large savings and little domestic investment prospects as a great 
investment opportunity. Large capital inflows quickly generate their own fundamentals: 
high growth rates driven by strong demand for consumption and/or construction 
investment, supported by easy credit fed from abroad. In all this the financial system, banks 
in particular, played a crucial role. They intermediated the flows and magnified the 
availability of credit through leverage by generating a tight network of intra-sector 
exposures. In this sense capital flows (and leverage) were the ‘financial manifestation’ of the 
macroeconomic imbalances. When the financial crisis broke in late 2007, the risk perception 
changed dramatically and resulted in a sudden stop of private capital flows. In principle 
macro imbalances within a monetary union do not matter in the classical sense by definition. 
If anything, imbalances were part of the euro plan: one of the purposes of having a single 
currency was exactly to stimulate capital flows and movements of resources from countries 
with excess savings towards countries with scare financial resources to promote faster 
growth. This is in fact what happened on a very large scale. Yet, the crisis brought about a 
new perspective and it was realized that there are two main reasons why intra-euro area 
imbalances may matter. The first one is that large and persisting inflows fundamentally 
mean the accumulation of external borrowing and, hence, debt in the receiving country; the 
second is that capital inflows do not necessarily finance productive investment able to ensure 
future growth and thus the creation of new resources to repay the debt. In some cases, 
inflows fund consumption and contribute to inflated bubbles, which produce temporary 
nominal growth but not a sustainable one.  
This is what happened in Greece and Portugal, where inflows mainly financed consumption, 
as suggested by very low national savings rates. Indeed, as shown earlier in Figure 1, the net 
national savings rate of Greece and Portugal were substantially in negative territory and the 
gross savings rates in single digits. The external deficits of Portugal and Greece were thus 
not due to particularly high investment, but to the fact that the increase in consumption over 
the last decade could not be financed out of current production. In the cases of Spain and 
Ireland, both of which have much higher national savings rates than Greece, the foreign debt 
financed mainly an excess of housing investment and a huge bubble in the construction 
sector.9  
In this perspective, moving back to sustainability fundamentally requires an expenditure 
adjustment for governments and/or the private sector, depending on where the problem of 
excessive borrowing lays. Overall, the adjustment should take place by reducing or 
eliminating further external borrowing, i.e. achieving a balanced or positive current account, 
and possibly attacking the stocks, i.e. deleveraging.  
3.  Reliance on foreign capital and the impact of higher risk premia 
The impact of increasing sovereign risk premia,10 described in the first part of the previous 
section, is not likely to remain limited to the cost of refinancing public debt, but it will affect 
                                                      
9 See Gros (2010b). 
10T o  a s s e s s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  b o n d s ,  t e x t b o o k s  u s u a l l y  
distinguish between Ricardian and non-Ricardian economies. If the Ricardian equivalence does not 8 |  GROS & ALCIDI 
 
the cost of use of capital for the private sector as well. An elevated risk premium on public 
debt is being transmitted to the entire domestic economy, thus providing an additional shock 
equivalent to a large interest rate increase for the private sector. 
There are several dimensions to take into account to understand why this is occurring, but 
the key element is the resource constraint for the entire economy. If the government tries to 
achieve a deficit reduction by cutting transfer spending or increasing taxes, households and 
enterprises have either to cut back consumption and/or investment, as predicted by the 
Keynesian effect discussed above, or they can try to borrow more. One could argue that 
fiscal consolidation could increase demand through a positive non-Keynesian effect on 
expectations (see among others Giavazzi et al., 2000). However, this is unlikely to be the case 
for Greece, Portugal and potentially also other peripheral countries, because the channel 
through which the non-Keynesian effect works is the domestic interest rate: reductions in the 
fiscal deficits are expected to reduce the domestic interest rate and therefore stimulate 
demand. This channel is broken in the case of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which now 
depend on official financing. 
These considerations imply that the estimates of the cost of fiscal adjustment suggested by 
the simple Keynesian multiplier are not so far off the mark as would be suggested by more 
complex models.  
In addition, under ordinary circumstances, higher funding costs for governments are 
reflected in higher funding costs for the private sector because in most financial systems 
government debt constitutes the benchmark for riskless assets. A similar principle applies to 
the international capital market in which private borrowers, especially banks, usually pay a 
higher interest rate than their own sovereign. For example, the rates charged for default 
insurance in CDS (credit default swaps) contracts for banks are almost always higher than 
the CDS rate for the sovereign in which the bank is headquartered. This implies that for the 
banks in the GIPS, the marginal cost for funding on the international market must have 
increased considerably. However, banks in the euro area have another source of funding: the 
ECB. With the full (unlimited) allotment policy of the ECB, any euro area bank can obtain as 
much funding as it desires as long as it has sufficient collateral. This last condition has not 
been difficult to satisfy since banks have been able to securitize part of their loan books, 
which they then use as collateral. Moreover, when difficulties arose the ECB has waived 
ratings requirements first regarding Greek government debt (April 2010) and then for all 
types of Irish securities (March 2011). This is the reason why the pass-through of higher risk 
premia on government debt to domestic borrowers has been rather limited so far.11 Instead 
of increasing, interest rates on (domestic) loans granted by banks of peripheral eurozone 
countries have actually fallen in the aftermath of the Lehman failure, as a consequence of the 
exceptional monetary policy measures undertaken by the ECB. Figure 2 shows the average 
interest rates on loans for house purchase in the GIPS and in Germany. All the series have a 
common trend driven by the changes in monetary policy, but interestingly and despite what 
one would expect, the rate in Germany is higher than in the other countries also after the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
hold, an increase in the return on government bonds, which are wealth for households, results in 
higher consumption, regardless of the reasons of the increase. By contrast, in a Ricardian economy, 
because the expectation of higher future taxes is discounted immediately, no effect on consumption 
should be observed. Crucially in both cases it is assumed that government debt is held by residents. 
However, reality differs from the textbook assumptions and the entire discussion about Ricardian 
equivalence is beside the point for countries such as Greece and Portugal, where the government 
deficit was financed by capital inflows. 
11 Moreover domestic funding costs have not increased as much as deposit rates have remained low. ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES AND DEBT OVERHANG IN THE EUROZONE PERIPHERY | 9 
 
crisis started. There has been some increase in peripheral mortgage rates since early 2010, but 
this has been rather limited compared to the very large increases in the risk premia on the 
government debt of these countries.  
 Figure 2. Interest rates on loans for house purchase  
 
Note:  Interest rates on loans for house purchase excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and 
extended credit card debt [A21-A2Z], Total, New business, to Households and non-profit institutions. 
Sources: ECB, Statistical warehouse. 
 
Figure 3 below provides evidence of the large borrowing by monetary and financial 
institutions from national central banks as a percentage of GDP and explains why domestic 
interest rates did not reflect usual the transmission mechanisms. The banking systems of 
Greece and Ireland have received a total of more than €200 billion in external funding via the 
ordinary monetary policy operations of the ECB. Without these huge transfers, which 
amounted to about 50% of GDP for Greece and 80% for Ireland, the economies of these two 
countries would have been subject to the same type of ‘sudden stop’ of capital inflows that 
happened in the Baltic nations, whose banking systems do not have access to the refinancing 
windows of the ECB (section 5 develops further this comparison).  
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Figure 3. MFIs’ borrowing from central banks (% of GDP) 
 
Sources: National central banks and authors’ calculations. 
Such large numbers suggest that while banks in both countries have been cut off from the 
interbank market, the ECB has played a crucial role of lender as last resort (but not really at a 
penalty rate, since the cost was only 1% until April 2011). Yet what was supposed to be an 
emergency, temporary measure risks becoming a source of addiction to cheap financing. If 
access to the ECB’s windows were to become more difficult, residents of Greece or Ireland 
would no longer be able to finance their current level of spending, and these economies 
would weaken further.  
Assuming that the risk premium for Greek banks would be equal to that of the Greek 
government outside the EU/IMF umbrella, i.e. around 700-800 basis points, the lending of 
the ECB to the Greek banking system amounts to an implicit subsidy worth around €8 billion 
or about 3% of GDP. This is more than the country receives in structural funds from the EU. 
For Ireland, the implicit subsidy is even larger and worth more than 4% of GDP, if one 
applies a risk premium of 600 basis points on the financing supplied by the ECB. 
The recourse to the ECB remains by far the cheapest source of funds for banks in the euro 
periphery, but as a result the risk on the balance sheet of the ECB will be increasing. This is 
why the ECB has recently tighten its eligibility criteria for the collateral it accepts (and is 
expected to do so again), as banks in the periphery (and some weak banks in core euro 
states) have exhibited a clear tendency to transform ever-more risky parts of their assets into 
securities that they could use as collateral for the ECB’s windows. 
4.  External debt sustainability: As boom turns to bust 
The analysis above has focused on the sustainability of government debt and the possible 
effects of fiscal consolidation on the real economy; however a comprehensive sustainability 
analysis of the position of a country should also include external debt. Given the dependency 
on foreign capital of many eurozone periphera l  c o u n t r i e s ,  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  i s  o f  c r u c i a l  
importance. In what follow we shall argue that fiscal adjustment alone is not sufficient if it is 
not accompanied by external adjustment. Foreign capital has become scarcer for some 
countries because financial markets have recognised that it is not only the internal fiscal 
position of the government that has become untenable as the boom has turned into a bust, 
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As of 2010, the total external debt of Greece amounts to more than €400 billion, i.e. almost 
190% of GDP (see Figure 4). Of it, about half has been issued by the government. In terms of 
GDP, this is equivalent to about 85%. Given that total government debt is about €340 billion 
(or 140% of GDP), this implies that about 60% of the government debt is held by foreigners 
(see Figure 5).13 Interestingly between 2009q3 and 2010q3, the total external debt of Greece 
has increased by about €25 billion, while the share issued by the government has fallen and 
the one issued by the monetary authorities has increase by more than €50 billion. Roughly 
speaking the debt of the monetary authority should be considered as public debt, hence two-
third of the total external position of Greece has a public source. However, holders of the 
monetary authorities’ debt do not belong to the private sector but, most likely, to the ESCB 
(European System of Central Banks). This makes that part of the debt relatively less 
vulnerable.   
In the case of Portugal, the total external position of the country relative to GDP is even 
larger than in Greece (more than 200%, see Figure 4), but the distribution across sectors is 
different. The total external debt of Portugal amounts to about €400 billion and one-fourth of 
it is issued by the government. Since the gross government debt amounts to about €140 
billion, this implies that about 65% of the government debt is held by non-residents (see 
Figure 5). Unlike Greece, in Portugal the private sector is largely exposed to external 
financing. Banks are exposed as much as 100% of GDP and the percentage increases to 132% 
if banks and the rest of the private sector are lumped together. This is far higher than in any 
other peripheral country (with the exception of Ireland). 
Spanish gross external debt is about 170% of GDP, little below the Greek debt but while in 
Greece the largest borrower is the government, in the case of Spain, the private sector and in 
particular banks are the most indebted to the rest of the world, i.e. about 115 percentage 
points of the GDP, altogether. In contrast, the government has the smallest, relative, external 
debt among within the GIPSY group. 
Lastly, Italy has the smallest total external debt as a percentage of GDP (about 120%) and it is 
almost equally shared between private (bank and other sectors) and public issuers. Given 
that Italian public debt is about 120% of GDP, this implies, as shown in Figure 5, that 46% of 
the Italian government debt is held by foreigners. Italian banks have the lowest relative 
exposure to the rest of the world.  
Overall the countries exhibit quite high heterogeneity and this feature persists also when 
looking at the net external debt. Indeed, in principle in the long run, when the return on the 
assets owned by all residents is supposed to be available to finance all debt service 
obligations, the proper concept to monitor is the net debt. Yet precise data on net debt are 
difficult to obtain. In theory, the net foreign indebtedness of a country should be equal to the 
gross debt minus foreign assets held by residents, but this is far too difficult to measure. An 
alternative evaluation is based on the cumulated current account balances over a quite long 
period of time. Figure 5 displays the net external debt as a % of GDP computed according to 
that method over the period 1990-2010. Greece and Portugal emerge as the countries with the 
largest net external debt relative to GDP, and Italy with the lowest one. 
                                                      
13 Note that in 2009, almost 75% of the government debt was held by non-residents.  
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Figure 6. Gross external debt (=GED) ratios as of 2010q3 
 
* The sector breakdown of the external debt is not available for Argentina; the ratio of total external debt to tax 
revenue in 1999 was 660%.  
Sources: National central banks, European Commission Services (AMECO), IFS (for Argentina), JHED (for 
Hungary external debt) and authors’ calculations. 
 
As argued earlier, net debt might be a more important concept in the longer run and 
therefore the variable to consider in the sustainability assessment. On this account, as shown 
in Figure 7, the indebtedness of most countries appears to be much smaller (and this is 
especially the case for Ireland).16  
Figure 7. Net External Debt ratios as of end 2010 
 
Note: Net external debt is computed as sum of the current account balances over the period 1990-2010, 1995-2010 
for Greece as earlier data are not available. For Hungary there is a large discrepancy between balance of 
payments figures included in the IFS and the national account figures provided by the European Commission. 
According to IFS data, net external debt as a % of GDP was 49% and 66% as a % of exports.    
                                                      
16 Note that the IMF external debt sustainability assessment for Greece only considers the net external 
debt.  
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Sources: National central banks, European Commission Services (AMECO), IFS (for Argentina), JHED (for 
Hungary external debt) and authors’ calculations. 
 
However, this was the case also for Argentina (and to some extent that of Hungary). It is not 
surprising given that Argentina had not run large current account deficits in the past: deficits 
of the size observed within the euro area would anyway not have been financed by 
international capital markets. Nonetheless, its government had borrowed heavily from 
international capital markets, whereas its citizens had preferred to send their money abroad 
rather than pay taxes at home. Argentina defaulted because the government was not able to 
tax the wealth its citizens had squirreled abroad. The Greek government (and not only) 
might find itself soon in a very similar position. This is why the gross debt figures are the 
more relevant ones in a time of crisis. 
4.2  The external adjustment 
Analogous to the standard analysis for fiscal sustainability, the key factor for external 
sustainability is the difference between the interest paid on foreign debt (rather than 
government debt) and the growth rate of exports (rather than the GDP growth, see Annex C 
for details). Similar to the result of the fiscal sustainability assessment, the situation about 
external sustainability appeared quite comfortable during the boom, when exports were 
growing at a rate even higher than GDP (and interest rates were low). However, the 
constellation has reversed since 2009 and export growth is likely to remain anaemic since the 
major export market of the countries under consideration is the eurozone itself, and its 
growth prospects are not encouraging.  
Table 5 shows the size of the trade balance surplus required to maintain external debt 
constant (and thus at the very high level as shown above) and the adjustment in the trade 
balance necessary to move from the current position to a sustainable path. According to the 
table, Italy is the country closest to external sustainability.  
Table 5. External adjustment needs for sustainability 
  
Actual trade 
balance (% of 
GDP) 
Risk premium   Trade surplus (% of 
GDP) required for 
sustainability 
Adjustment required 
for sustainability 
Greece 
-7.3 8  17 24 
Ireland 
-19.3 6  64 45 
Portugal 
-8.0 4  11 19 
Spain 
-2.1 1.8  4 6 
Italy 
-0.8 1.5  2 3 
Note: The trade balance that would be compatible with sustainable debt is derived from eq. (C3) in Appendix C. It 
is calculated based on the assumption that the export growth rate is the same for all countries and equal to 1.5% 
(market growth as predicted by the European Commission services) and using data on gross external debt as 
documented in Figure 5. Measures for risk premia, as previously explained, do not pretend to be exact and are 
only indicative; they are the same as in Table 3.  
Sources: Own calculations based on AMECO and IFS data. 
Putting aside Ireland, which represents a special case,17 the largest adjustment is required in 
Greece and Portugal. The data suggest that in order to avoid accumulation of further 
                                                      
17 As noted earlier, since external debt data comprise the debt of local subsidiaries owned by foreign 
corporations, the computation of the trade surplus required for sustainability is unduly affected by 
this phenomenon (which does not really represent foreign debt).   16 |  GROS & ALCIDI 
 
external debt, both countries will either have to face a reduction in their consumption of 
foreign goods equivalent to about 20% of GDP or experience a considerable export boom 
assisted by a substantial internal devaluation (i.e. a cut in nominal wages throughout the 
economy). Since the latter is rather unlikely in the short run, it seems that a substantial 
compression in domestic demand is unavoidable before external equilibrium can be reached. 
As a sustainable external position is a pre-condition for lower risk premia on international 
financial markets, it is thus likely that these risk premia will not fall substantially as long as 
the external deficits continue at their present unsustainable scale.  
Section 4 has highlighted the need for large adjustment in demand, and in particular 
consumption, in countries with large external debt and deficits. It is clear, from the general 
equilibrium perspective, that deficit countries can adjust only if surplus countries accept the 
corresponding counterpart: a reduction in their surpluses. Given that Germany has the 
largest surplus in Europe, many commentators have argued that the adjustment in the euro 
area periphery would be possible only if Germany stimulates its domestic demand.18 
However European Commission data for 2010 show that the combined surplus of the three 
smaller creditor nations – Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands – is about €90 billion, 
not much smaller than that of Germany (€120 billion). In addition the external adjustment of 
the three countries most in need – Greece, Portugal and Spain – amounts to more than €80 
billion, just below 1% of the euro area’s GDP. A stronger expansion of domestic demand in 
Germany can be desirable to facilitate this adjustment, but, given the orders of magnitude 
and the distribution of surpluses, it seems far-fetched to expect Germany to fundamentally 
change its approach to economic policy in order to allow peripheral countries to return to a 
sustainable external position.  
In addition, exports are unlikely to be able to adjust over a short period and re-
establishexternal sustainability. This implies, as anticipated earlier in section 4, that a 
downward adjustment in spending will be inevitable.  
In this perspective, the experience of the Baltic countries is very insightful. Trends in capital 
flows similar to the ones towards the eurozone periphery had emerged also in the north 
periphery of the EU. Between 2003 and 2007, large amounts of private capital flew from 
surplus countries, especially Nordic countries (e.g. Sweden), towards the Baltic states to fund 
consumption and construction bubbles. When the financial crisis broke in late 2007, the risk 
perception changed dramatically and resulted in a sudden stop of capital flows. Since the 
Baltic economies decided to keep their parity with the euro unchanged, the only way 
forward for them was an internal devaluation: a fall in prices and wages. This materialized in 
an impressive contraction in spending, which has turned the current account balance into 
positive figures quite rapidly. Internal devaluation followed in order to lay the base for 
export-led growth (in the case of Latvia nominal unit labour costs fell by 17% within two 
years). To get a sense of the overall correction, Figure 8 displays the dramatic change in the 
current account balance between 2007 and 2010 in the ELL (=Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) 
and compares it with comparable data in the GIPS (=Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).   
                                                      
18  See remarks by French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde in the Financial Times, 15 March 2010.  
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growing again, but it will take time (several years) to have its full effects. If this is done in 
conjunction with a substantial reduction in the debt burden, the country should become 
viable again. 
Ireland is the opposite case since the country has little foreign debt and should run a current 
account surplus already in 2011. The main focus of the adjustment programme for Ireland 
should thus be to mobilize the considerable foreign assets of the private sector in the service 
of the large public debt (owned mainly to foreigners). This could be done, for example, by 
‘inducing’ Irish pension funds to repatriate their foreign assets and invest them in Irish 
government bonds. This might actually be enough to substitute most of the EFSF 
programme, given that Irish pension funds own over €75 billion euro in assets, of which a 
large proportion is invested abroad.  Such an approach would of course require a change in 
Irish regulations (and probably some exemptions from EU directives), but it could lead to a 
rapid compression of spreads. 
Portugal is again different since in this case the government is not over-indebted (its 
debt/GDP ratio is about the same as France). The EFSF package for Portugal was sold by the 
government as a victory because the country obtained a couple of years more to delay the 
fiscal adjustment. However, in the case of Portugal the real underlying problem is one of 
foreign debt, not so much public debt. 
The key issue for Portugal is thus how to avoid a further accumulation of foreign debt, in 
other words, how to turn the current account into surplus. As for Greece (and the Baltics 
whose experience we summarise), this will require a substantial cut (+/-20%) in 
consumption. As for Greece a cut in wages would foster adjustment in both the short and 
long run. 
If the adjustment is left to fiscal policy alone, the risk is that households might have to pay 
higher taxes, but might continue consuming since they can get credit at lower rates than their 
government. This is the key difference between countries in the eurozone: as their banks can 
refinance themselves cheaply through the ECB and they can continue to consume, thus 
delaying the adjustment.  
What is needed in Portugal is not thus only, and not even mainly, a fiscal adjustment, but a 
reduction in private consumption, especially any consumption financed by credit. The 
country would thus need to tax consumption credit. A temporary surcharge in VAT would 
also help, as it would induce households to delay consumption. 
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Annex A. Keynesian multipliers and the effect of fiscal consolidation 
Assuming a simple open economy in which consumption depends on income, exports are 
determined by foreign demand (and hence exogenous in the short run) and imports vary 
proportionally with domestic income, the impact of an exogenous change in government 
spending on GDP can then be computed as follows: 
(A1)  G
m c
Y Δ
+ −
= Δ
1
1
  
Where G is government spending, c is marginal propensity of consumption and m the 
marginal propensity to import. The pure Keynesian multiplier is thus given by 1/(1-c+m), or 
1/(s+m), where s is the marginal propensity to save (of the private sector). In percentage 
terms equation (1) can be written as a relationship between the change in government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and the growth rate of GDP: 
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In this simplest of Keynesian approaches, the change in government expenditure is 
exogenous and the same multiplier would apply to any other exogenous change in 
expenditure, for example exports or investment. However, under the present circumstances 
it is difficult to find any major expenditure category that could be ‘crowded in’ indirectly as a 
consequence of a cut in government expenditure. Given that banks throughout the euro area 
seem still reluctant to extend credit, investment is likely to remain weak everywhere. 
Similarly, intra-area exports are unlikely to revive given that major changes in cost 
competitiveness can occur only via major cuts in nominal wages, which are not in the cards 
for the time being. 
The large drop in output indicated by the simplistic multipliers suggests that fiscal 
consolidation might be much more difficult than assumed by the official convergence 
programs since the drop in output will also lead to lower tax revenues. If tax revenues vary 
with demand, the multiplier has to be adjusted at each stage of spending to take into account 
the leakage which includes not only savings and imports but also taxes. Assuming that 
additional revenues face a marginal tax rate of t, the multiplier becomes as follows:19 
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19 Here we make the assumption that  tY T T + =  and  gY G G + =  (both Government spending 
and tax revenue have an exogenous component and a component proportional to the income) and that 
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Table A1. Keynesian multipliers including tax  
Country 
Keynesian multiplier including 
tax: 1/(s+m+t) 
Impact of government spending on 
deficit: (s+m)/(s+m+t) 
Greece  1.4 0.5 
Italy  0.8 0.5 
Spain  1.0 0.5 
Portugal  0.9 0.6 
Germany  0.5 0.8 
Ireland  0.9 0.7 
Note: t, the marginal tax rate, is computed as ratio of the increment in tax burden of the total economy relative to 
the increment in GDP over the period 2002-07.  
Source: AMECO. 
This multiplier is considerably lower than the one calculated above. However, in this case 
the change in the deficit that can be achieved by a cut in government spending is also smaller 
and reads as follows: 
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Equation (4) suggests that the final impact on the deficit will be only a fraction of the cut in 
government expenditure. This in turn means that the ‘effort’ in terms of cutting expenditure 
might be much higher than assumed so far. 
Taking into account taxation thus suggests that the multiplier is lower, but the required cut 
in expenditure higher. These two effects just cancel out as one can see by substituting 
equation (4) back into equation (3) which confirms the original multiplier in terms of the 
required deficit reduction: 
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This implies that of Greece were to achieve a reduction in the deficit of 4 percentage points of 
GDP, government expenditure should be cut by about 8 percentage points which is expected 
to reduce output by about 11%. 
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Annex B. Fiscal sustainability  
The traditional debt sustainability analysis concentrates on a simple question: Is the debt-to-
GDP ratio compatible with the government’s intertemporal budget constraint? The answer to 
this question is affirmative if the present constellation of expected primary deficits, growth 
rates and interest rates can go on forever, without leading to exploding debt levels. 
Typically, standard exercises focus on the fiscal adjustment that will keep the time sequence 
of public debt-to-GDP ratios constant. The rationale is that if the debt-to-GDP ratio is, at 
least, stable, the inter-temporal budget constraint is satisfied. A constant debt-to-GDP ratio 
requires that:  
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where  D P is the primary deficit compatible with a sustainable debt, Y is the GDP at current 
prices, D the general government debt, i is the ‘implicit’ interest rate (actual interests paid 
divided by the stock of debt), y is the nominal GDP growth rate, SF20 is the stock-flow 
adjustment and subscript t stands for time. The element (Dt-1/Yt)×[(it-yt)/(1+yt)] represents 
the so-called snowball effect and crucially depends of the difference between (long run, steady 
state) interest rate and growth rate. The stock-flow adjustment captures the various factors 
that influence changes in the valuation of the stock of debt (or debt assumption outside the 
budget). The latter element has become much more important in many countries as 
government support for banks resulted in large increases in public debt that is not accounted 
for under the normal (national accounts based) deficit figures. 
Traditional debt sustainability analysis is based on mathematical approach that provides the 
condition for a process, namely the debt-to-GDP ratio, to be non explosive. While this 
provides useful indications about the determinants of debt dynamics which are then used to 
derive policy recommendations, this approach embeds shortcomings that become 
particularly acute when applied to foreign debt or/and in times of stress and thus high risk 
premia.  
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Annex C. The sustainability of the external debt 
As shown in the tables above, Greece, Portugal and Spain exhibit very high external debt. One 
important implication of it is that ultimately it has to be serviced by a ‘transfer’ of resources to the 
rest of the world through exports (of goods and services). Accordingly the external debt-to-
exports ratio is more relevant than the standard debt-to-GDP ratio to assess the external 
sustainability.  
Applying the traditional approach of debt sustainability to the foreign debt implies that the 
condition under which the foreign debt-to-export ratio is stable is: 
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Where  t B T  is the sustainable trade balance, ND is net external debt and e is the exports growth 
rate. Similarly to the case of government debt, the stability condition is given by the relative size 
of the interest rate with respect to the growth rate. Yet when considering net external debt, 
another source of complexity emerges. A country net external debt is defined as the difference 
between assets and liabilities (this is the gross debt) net of foreign investment. In time of crisis the 
interest paid by a country on its liabilities is larger than the one it receives on its holdings, with 
the difference being the risk premium. Accounting for this implies that the condition above is 
modified as follows:        
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Where irf is the risk free rate, π is the risk premium and GD the gross external debt. The existence 
of the risk premium makes external adjustment more difficult. 
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This equation shows that the (change in the) trade balance as a proportion of GDP required to 
maintain sustainability after the emergence of a risk premium is roughly proportional to the 
gross debt to export ratio times the ratio of exports to GDP. Formally the difference between the 
trade balances (as a proportion of GDP) which main external debt constant in a boom and bust 
would be given by: 
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where it is assumed, as usual that (1+e) is approximately equal to one. 
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